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Labour market policies, poverty and insecurity 
 
Abstract 
The article sets out to evaluate the performance of conventional labour market and social 
policies in the era of globalised labour markets in terms of poverty alleviation, equality and 
security. To this end, it develops a framework based on three policy evaluation principles, 
centred on the normative notion of social justice, whereby the expansion of full freedom 
requires basic economic security for all. The article is organised as follows: After 
summarising main labour market trends, the paper proceeds by analysing conventional labour 
market policies, targeted labour schemes, regulatory interventions and cash transfers as labour 
market policy. 
Key words: labour markets, cash transfers, poverty, insecurity 
 
Introduction 
We are in the midst of a global transformation in which one of the most distinctive features is 
the painful evolution of a globalising labour market. This transformation testifies not only to 
the spread of capitalism to all parts of the world economy but also to the establishment of a 
particular variant of capitalism based on the belief that all markets should be flexible. There 
has accordingly been an international move to more flexible labour systems (Author, 1999a) 
but, more broadly, for the first time in history, all groups in all societies are expected to face 
insecurity and accept risk-taking as a way of life. 
The outcome has been heightened social and economic insecurity, and rising economic 
inequality. In particular, there has been a big shift in the functional distribution of income 
within countries and across the global economy, giving workers (labour) a reduced share and 
capital (profits) a much greater share. Personal income distribution has become more unequal, 
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and wage differentials between those with tertiary schooling and others have also tended to 
widen.  
It is widely accepted that these trends reflect the impact of globalisation and economic 
liberalisation rather than the impact of technological and structural changes that have raised 
the return to education. Policies focused on altering the characteristics of workers (to make 
them more ‘employable’) would thus not be the appropriate answer to the inequality and 
poverty associated with globalisation. 
The article sets out to evaluate the performance of conventional labour market and 
social policies in the era of globalised labour markets in terms of poverty alleviation, equality 
and security. To this end, it develops a framework based on three policy evaluation principles, 
centred on the normative notion of social justice, whereby the expansion of full freedom 
requires basic economic security for all. The article is organised as follows: after summarising 
main labour market trends, the article proceeds by analysing conventional labour market 
policies, targeted labour schemes, regulatory interventions and cash transfers as labour market 
policy. 
 
Labour market trends 
Before considering the advantages and disadvantages of specific labour market policies, it is 
worth summarising the main trends and challenges for the relief of poverty and insecurity in 
developing countries. 
First and foremost, the global labour force has quadrupled since 1980. The increase in 
labour supply available for open labour markets has risen faster still, particularly since China 
and India have liberalised their economies, allowing multinationals to shift all or part of their 
production to extremely low-wage areas in which there is effectively an unlimited labour 
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supply at existing wage rates. While the rate of increase may slow, the world’s working-age 
population will continue to grow.   
Second, ageing – and old-age poverty – is a global trend. Already most of the world’s 
elderly live in developing countries. While labour market policies have understandably tended 
to pay more attention to the many millions of disaffected youth, policies to enable older 
people to have a dignifying livelihood will require a much higher priority in coming years. 
Third, a majority of the world’s population now lives in or around urban areas and, as 
part of that urbanisation process, various forms of migration are spreading. Much of the 
movement is linked to labour and the increasingly transient and precarious nature of labour 
relations. There has been a growth of international household chains, whereby millions of 
people migrate from low-income areas to perform menial labour in rich and middle-income 
countries, often leaving behind them structurally vulnerable households and families 
dependent on remittances. 
Fourth, the global system is increasingly characterised by ‘tertiarisation’: most people in 
jobs are doing service activities, rather than agricultural, mining or manufacturing labour. 
Even in China and India, the two industrial workshops of the world economy, very rapid rates 
of industrial growth have not been associated with growth of manufacturing employment. 
 Fifth, the defining feature of the globalisation era has been the spread of 
informalisation. Far from being a residual destined to shrink as economies industrialised, 
informalisation has become pervasive. Large modern enterprises have been leading the way, 
by contracting out much of their labour function, using sub-contractors, casual labour and 
agency labour. In addition, partly driven by structural adjustment programmes, state 
enterprises in many countries have systematically contracted out large parts of their formal 
employment.  
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Labour informalisation is associated with precariousness, lack of labour contracts and 
widespread illegality. On average, incomes and wages are much lower for informal labour 
(see e.g. Fundação SEADE 2005; Sengupta, Kannan & Raveendran, 2008). However, it 
would be a mistake to interpret informalisation simply as chronic impoverished under-
employment, a distinct and homogenous ‘informal sector’. Informalisation increasingly 
applies to jobs associated with formal enterprises, and many people work informally by 
choice. 
Sixth, another feature of the globalised labour system is global feminisation (Author 
1989, 1999b). This reflects a double trend – a spread of precarious forms of labour and a 
relative growth of employment of women, the latter partly reflecting the restructuring of 
employment and labour towards the sort of jobs traditionally taken by women. 
   
Conventional labour market policies 
What we might call conventional labour market policies were developed during the course of 
the twentieth century as part of welfare state capitalism, based on an ‘industrial citizenship’ 
model linking social entitlements to holding a formal job. They include minimum wage 
policy, unemployment insurance benefits and labour market training schemes, as well as 
schemes to promote various forms of mobility – geographical, occupational and social. 
Implicit is the assumption that jobs are there to be had, if not now then in the near future.   
With all forms of labour market policy – and social policy in general – there has been 
insufficient evaluation of their effects and effectiveness. This is particularly true for policies 
that have been tried in developing countries. In some cases, there is what should be described 
as monitoring, but not evaluation. Thus, official statistics may show that 1,000 workers were 
covered by a wage subsidy, leading some commentators to claim that the subsidy generated 
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1,000 jobs, whereas the workers or firms benefiting from the subsidy may simply be 
displacing others not receiving the subsidy. 
A further difficulty with evaluating labour market policies is that they usually have 
several and sometimes conflicting objectives. For instance, they may be rationalised as 
instruments for reducing poverty or unemployment and as instruments for improving 
economic growth and productivity. But which of those objectives has priority? If short-term 
growth and productivity improvement were uppermost, the policy might concentrate on 
raising the employment of the highly educated and others with formal skills, since their short-
term productivity would be greater than would be likely among the poor and less educated. 
Indeed, in some cases, laying off workers would be a way of raising average productivity and 
boosting profitability and growth; this was a deliberate policy pursued by the Chinese 
government in the 1990s. 
 We shall consider the main pillars of labour market policy from the vantage point of 
poverty alleviation, coupled with certain policy evaluation principles. The principles are 
elaborated elsewhere (Author, 2002; ILO, 2004) but, for our purposes, the three most 
important are: 
• A policy is socially just only if it improves the security and work prospects of the least 
secure groups in society (the security difference principle); 
• A policy is socially just only if it does not impose controls on some groups that are not 
imposed on the most free groups in society (the paternalism test principle); 
• A policy is socially just if it enhances the rights of the recipient of benefits or services and 
limits the discretionary power of the providers (the rights-not-charity principle). 
• First, we may make a few remarks on direct regulatory interventions with respect to child 
labour and discrimination.  
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Child labour policy 
Child labour and poverty are obviously closely related. Very poor communities with limited 
resources usually rely to some extent on the work input of children. It is often not easy to ban 
child labour of all kinds in these societies. In recent years, the International Labour 
Organisation has modified its stance and its International Programme for the Elimination of 
Child Labour (IPEC) has pursued a policy of banning hazardous forms of child labour.  
Such labour threatens children with permanent impoverishment, as well as injury and 
illness. However, the optimum way to curb child labour is to give families adequate economic 
security and incentives for them to ensure that their children enrol and attend primary and 
secondary school. Schemes such as the Bolsa familia in Brazil and Oportunidades in Mexico, 
whereby mothers receive a monthly basic income on the condition that their children attend 
school, have shown themselves to be much more effective in tackling child labour and in 
reducing poverty than simple bans.     
 
Anti-discrimination measures 
All countries experience patterns of discrimination in the allocation of labour and work, for 
example, against women, migrants or ethnic minorities. Measures to combat discrimination 
are essential tools against poverty and inequality. But too often laws are passed and then 
grossly inadequate resources are devoted to ensure that they are effectively implemented.  
One consequence of the ideological onslaught on public expenditure around the world 
has been the rundown of labour inspectorates. Poorly paid labour inspectors are subject to 
bribes and threats, and cannot monitor discriminatory practices and such matters as non-
payment of wages, and neglect of health and safety procedures. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that numerous workers in Asia, Africa and Latin America are impoverished by non-adherence 
to basic labour laws. A simple but rather overlooked policy would be to pay labour inspectors 
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higher wages and benefits, improving their quality and enabling them to resist ‘backhanders’ 
and other forms of pressure that make them so ineffectual. They play a small, unglamorous 
role in limiting labour market poverty.    
 
Minimum wages 
Statutory minimum wages really only work moderately to reduce poverty in industrial labour 
markets where formal employment is high and collective bargaining is widespread. Although 
they still exist in many countries, they have dwindled in their effectiveness. They are hard to 
apply in flexible informal labour markets, and require institutions to monitor them.  
Critics have long claimed that minimum wages hurt rather than help low-skilled, low-
productivity workers, who make up a large proportion of the poor in most countries. If 
minimum wages are set at subsistence level, low-skilled workers are either excluded from 
employment or are employed only in unregistered activities, leaving them vulnerable to 
exploitation and a lack of protective safeguards. Yet the critics surely exaggerate the negative 
effect of minimum wages, if only because they cannot be and are not effectively 
implemented. They may, at best, provide a standard of decency, to guide employers and 
workers on what would be fair and reasonable. That in itself is reason enough to maintain 
them. 
 
Unemployment benefits 
Unemployment insurance benefits, where employees paid contributions or had them paid for 
by their employers, were conceived in the late nineteenth century, and spread to all 
industrialised countries in the early decades of the twentieth century. Attempts were then 
made to introduce them to developing countries, with very limited success. In the rich welfare 
states, benefit schemes started to diverge in the 1970s, with some countries moving to 
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unemployment assistance (means-tested benefits given to those who could demonstrate that 
they were both poor and involuntarily unemployed) and others adopting workfare-type 
schemes (benefits provided only on the condition that the recipient complied with some 
behaviour linked to the labour market, such as taking a low-status, low-paid job or entering a 
labour market training scheme). 
The fact is that old-style unemployment insurance benefit schemes are rapidly 
disappearing in industrialised countries. Very few developing countries have functional 
unemployment benefit systems at all, one exception being the Republic of Korea. In most of 
those that have some scheme, only tiny minorities of the unemployed have entitlement to 
benefits. There is no reason to believe that, in the foreseeable future, state-based 
unemployment protection could become an effective weapon against poverty and labour 
market marginalisation in developing countries. 
 
Social insurance versus social assistance 
The underlying principle of social insurance has been that contributions, whether paid by 
employers or employees, would match benefits paid out, making the system fiscally neutral. 
In the process, a loose system of social solidarity would be established, with those fortunate 
enough not to need benefits subsidising those who did need them. Benefit entitlements would 
be determined by contingency risks, linked to unemployment, illness, maternity and so on.  
Even in the rich industrialised countries, it has not worked out quite like that, and in 
developing countries social insurance has failed dismally as an anti-poverty policy. In flexible 
labour markets with high levels of informality, only very small proportions of the labour force 
are covered by social insurance schemes. Indeed, they are regressive since, to the extent that 
they work at all, they provide benefits and protection for higher-income employees. Social 
insurance contributions are easy to avoid in informal labour markets, while for many workers 
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in casual or informal economic activities building up entitlements can be practically 
impossible. 
The trend in industrialised countries has been to shift towards much greater use of social 
assistance in determining entitlement to benefits, through means testing and so-called 
‘targeting’. Advocates of moving further in this direction claim that determining who is poor 
by checking on their income will direct benefits to the poorest, and that such targeting will 
ensure good use of scarce resources and help legitimise tax-based social transfers with 
middle-class voters. 
All parts of that argument are dubious. Evidence shows that means testing is costly to 
undertake and notoriously inequitable and inefficient (see ILO, 2004 and sources cited there). 
In developing countries, it is very hard to define or measure the poverty line reliably and 
meaningfully, and whatever measure is used the take-up rate is very low. Those who do 
manage to receive such benefits are often the near-poor rather than the poorest. And means 
testing produces severe poverty traps, since anybody who begins to earn income risks losing 
the benefit. There are other objections, including the stigmatizing effects of such schemes. 
And ultimately they turn out to be discretionary, since local bureaucrats and politicians can 
manipulate them to give to those they wish to support and exclude others. 
 
Labour market training 
Training is often regarded as the definitive ‘active’ labour market policy. The common belief 
is that an important source of poverty and unemployment is a lack of skills and inadequate 
training schemes. Yet the evidence for this is scarce. 
First of all, statistics on the possession of skills are rare. Most of the available 
information refers to the distribution of jobs and the numbers having primary, secondary and 
tertiary schooling, both very crude indicators of skill. There is also little convincing evidence 
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that skill shortages are major impediments to economic growth, or a critical barrier to poverty 
alleviation. 
Labour market training refers to government schemes. In some cases, the government 
funds a training centre and funds the attendance of trainees, giving them a stipend or simply 
subsidising the training costs. Such schemes tend to suffer from an understandable pattern of 
‘creaming’, whereby most of the trainees - particularly most of the trainees who successfully 
complete the training course and who subsequently obtain employment - are not from the 
poorest groups in society.  
In the other, more popular, type of training scheme the government or donor provides a 
subsidy to firms to provide more training. This policy suffers from three major drawbacks. 
First, the training is unlikely to be provided to the most disadvantaged and poor groups, since 
they are likely to be perceived as the hardest to train and the least likely to yield a high rate of 
return to the employer. Second, the schemes are likely to have a large deadweight effect, that 
is, the subsidy will be provided to firms that would have done the training anyhow. And third, 
they are likely to have a large substitution effect (or displacement effect), that is, they are 
likely to result in firms substituting workers receiving the training subsidy for workers or 
trainees who are not doing so.    
More broadly, there has been an international trend towards shaping educational policy 
in general in the direction of ‘human capital’ formation. Universities and colleges are being 
encouraged to focus increasingly on preparing young people for jobs. There is also a strong 
trend towards the privatisation and commercialisation of schooling at all levels, not just at the 
tertiary end of the spectrum. These trends are controversial, since they are transforming the 
nature of education, eroding it as preparation for life and culture in the narrower interest of 
‘employability’, and making schooling a matter of investment, which make it more selective 
of those who can pay and of those interested in subjects that promise a market return. 
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State pensions as labour market policy  
Old-age and other pensions might not be seen as labour market policy. However, their 
existence and design are crucial determinants of patterns of work and labour as well as the 
extent of old-age poverty and the income status of others receiving a form of pension, such as 
those qualifying for disability benefits. 
The story of pensions in the globalisation era is fairly clear. There has been shrinking 
coverage by defined-benefit contributory schemes around the world. Instead, governments 
and corporations have been shifting to defined-contribution schemes, while many more 
workers are finding that they have no state or corporate pension linked to their employment. 
In developing countries, only tiny minorities receive adequate corporate (so-called 
occupational) pensions or public sector pensions. 
Instead, the two types of schemes that have spread are individual savings accounts, as 
developed in Chile in the 1980s and has been copied to a certain extent in many countries 
since then, and so-called social pensions. Whereas the Chilean experience has demonstrated 
clearly that the individualised defined-contribution route leads to greater old-age inequality 
and poverty among a large proportion of pension-age people, social pensions offer a realistic 
means of lowering poverty, not only among the elderly but also among their younger 
relatives. There is convincing evidence that they have had a positive effect in reducing 
poverty and community deprivation in countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Nepal and 
Mauritius (for a review of evidence, see Author, 2007, 2008). 
By definition, social pensions are universal and rights-based. Where they exist they 
result in a very high take-up rate, in excess of 90 per cent of the age group, which compares 
extremely well with all other types of pension scheme. They offer a social protection floor 
and they are also an effective redistributive fiscal instrument. In South Africa, for instance, it 
has been argued that the basic old-age pension has been the only effective means of reducing 
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income inequality in the country (Case & Deaton, 1998). Social pensions have also proved to 
be affordable, admittedly partly because of the low amount of income provided but partly also 
because of the low administrative cost. Moreover, they have the rather valuable property of 
transparency, in that everybody knows what should be paid and who is entitled, making 
political or bureaucratic corruption harder.  
Evidence shows that social pensions can and do help fund the schooling and nutrition of 
grandchildren. They also help elderly people participate in the economy, and help families in 
rural areas take risks by buying seeds and fertilisers, knowing that they have a regular source 
of income on which to rely. As such, social pensions have beneficial effects on livelihood 
regeneration. They also score highly on the three key policy evaluation principles, reaching 
those in most need, being non-paternalistic (no behavioural conditions) and being based on 
rights rather than discretionary acts of state or private charity. 
 
Targeted labour schemes 
The world has accumulated vast experience and knowledge about selective or targeted labour 
market schemes. We may focus on four types of schemes that have figured in many 
developing countries – food-for-work schemes, public works, employment and wage 
subsidies, and microcredit and finance. 
 
Food-for-work schemes 
Under this rubric we may include all schemes that offer participants some specific commodity 
in return for labour. It has usually been food, but in some cases it has been clothes or other 
items. The distribution of food parcels in return for labouring on an infrastructural project has 
been an instrument of state policy for many generations all over the world. Some countries 
have relied very heavily on food-for-work schemes. In Ethiopia, for instance, albeit an 
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extreme case, the Government has devoted 80 per cent of its food assistance to food-for-work 
projects. 
The primary claim is that such schemes effectively target the poor: they are self-
selecting, since they require applicants to go and queue for opportunities. And like all direct 
employment measures of the workfare kind, they are relatively easy to legitimize among the 
middle class, who can see people working for their food. It is also argued that such schemes 
can be relatively easily focused on pre-determined vulnerable groups, notably women. Indeed, 
the World Food Programme, which has been a major player behind food-for-work schemes, 
has required governments to make women the major beneficiaries. 
The main shortcoming of food-for-work schemes is the onerous labour often involved 
so that those working in the heat and dust use up more calories than they gain from the food 
given to them at the end. The schemes may actually be detrimental to participants’ health, 
particularly women, as has been observed in Ethiopia, India and Nepal (Osmani, 1997; 
Quisumbing, 2003). 
Besides being inefficient and rarely producing much of lasting value, another failing of 
food-for-work schemes is the powerful tendency for officials to misappropriate the food, 
either for their own consumption or, more often, to sell it for profit. A study of the National 
Food for Work Programme in Andhra Pradesh, India, found that in the villages examined, the 
proportion of rice misappropriated by politicians and bureaucrats varied between 49 and 98 
per cent (Dreze, 2006).   
 It is doubtful whether food-for-work schemes are an appropriate policy for promoting 
livelihoods except in extreme circumstances. They are unlikely to reach the most desperately 
in need and they are obviously paternalistic, presuming that what is missing is food. They are 
also more consistent with charity than with the extension of human rights.  
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Public works 
Public works have a hallowed place in both development policy and anti-unemployment 
strategies. As social policy, public works are often presented as self-selecting or self-
targeting, on the grounds that only those who are desperately in need of income will offer to 
work on public works projects. And it is often claimed that public works not only bring the 
poor up to or above some poverty line but also help to lower wages in the labour market.  
Public works can and often do create some infrastructure. The question is whether the 
results are sustainable, durable or more efficient than other ways of producing such 
infrastructure. There are too many stories of shoddy output from public works, with roads 
hastily and cheaply built being washed away by the first heavy rains. This is particularly 
likely where the objective of maximising employment leads to highly labour-intensive 
methods based on unskilled, poorly supervised and ill-trained labour.  
A related criticism of public works is that they tend to be predominantly short-term 
‘make-work’ schemes. Productivity is low, and the labour is temporary, so they do not 
provide either value for money or sustainable employment. Inefficiency is compounded by 
high administrative and monitoring costs, which severely cut the proportion of funds spent on 
public works that goes to the intended beneficiaries. It is generally estimated that, of all forms 
of social protection, public works have the highest administrative costs as a share of total 
expenditure. 
It is also clear that often there are large-scale substitution and deadweight effects. In 
other words, those employed on public works may merely displace others doing the same 
work for private firms, or they may be doing something that would have been done anyhow.  
Another criticism is that the degree of effective targeting is, in practice, very limited. 
The usual objective is to provide labour for the poorest and for the unemployed in greatest 
financial need. However, numerous evaluation studies have found that this is not what usually 
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happens. One obvious problem is that public works discriminate against labour-constrained 
households. Another is that those living far from the worksites have the greatest difficulty in 
taking the available work opportunities. And those with disabilities are least likely to be able 
to do the work on offer. Women, in particular, are often penalised because of severe time 
pressure due to their other work demands in and around the home.  
This bias against women can be countered by design changes, as in the Zibambele 
scheme in South Africa, where 93 per cent of participants were women (McCord, 2004; 
Samson, van Niekerk & MacQuene, 2006). India’s Mahatma Ghandi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) has established anti-discrimination provisions, 
access to on-site childcare and worksites close to the homes of potential participants. 
However, similar provisions were included in the long-running Maharashtra Employment 
Guarantee Scheme, on which the NREGS was modelled, and which still has only a minority 
of women among its participants, even though many more women have traditionally been 
registered in the scheme (Gaiha & Imai, 2005). 
Even if public works do succeed in exclusively targeting the poor, they may create 
poverty traps, with all the moral and immoral hazards that these entail. Immoral hazards arise 
from an inducement to lie in order to qualify for participation in a scheme. In very poor 
communities, the poor and vulnerable will have an interest in staying just below the poverty 
line or at least appearing to do so, simply in order to qualify for the available income-support 
scheme on offer. This is surely a perverse incentive.  
Another controversy centres on the wages paid to participants in public works. Many 
supporters believe the schemes should pay decent wages, or the market wage rate. Often, the 
wage is determined by that prevailing for agricultural manual labour, which is supported by 
some economists (Ravallion, 1999). Others have said the wage should be below the market 
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wage (Hirway & Terhal, 1994; Subbarao, 2003), and some argue that schemes should pay at 
or even below the minimum wage, as a means of self-targeting the poor.  
Certainly, the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) long limited 
participation with a low minimum wage, which was how it maintained its claim to ‘guarantee’ 
work for all those applying. Once the courts ruled that it had to pay the official minimum 
wage, and particularly after the minimum wage went up, the scheme had to ration labour, 
ceasing to be a ‘guarantee’ (Subbarao, 2003).  
As with other cash-for-work schemes, if the wage is set below subsistence it offends 
principles underlying minimum wage laws, and may intensify poverty (McCord, 2005). And 
if the objective of paying sub-subsistence wages is to induce self-targeting, the result may be 
the opposite of what is intended, because it may mean that only those with access to some 
other source of income can afford to take the low-paying public works jobs. Most perversely 
of all, paying sub-subsistence wages may actually worsen the poverty of the participants if 
they are induced to give up other forms of work, and if this disrupts structured livelihood 
systems in local communities.  
For example, in the public projects in Malawi, the wage was set at the equivalent of 
US$0.30 per day. An evaluation study commissioned by the Government found that the very 
low wages were ineffective in recruiting the very poor, while participants risked greater 
poverty as a result of the hard manual labour that required more food, leaving them more 
exposed to malnutrition and healthcare needs (Chirwa et al., 2004). Poor labour-constrained 
households may be unable to take very low-wage jobs because they would have to give up 
other essential domestic and subsistence activities.    
Paying low wages on public works also tends to lower the average wage in other jobs in 
low-income areas. Perversely, this could result in more widespread impoverishment by 
depressing family incomes. Moreover, many public works schemes have been dilatory in 
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paying workers. In the Malawi scheme, delays in payment went on for months, resulting in 
indebtedness and considerable local distress (Chirwa McCord, Mvula & Pinder, 2004).  
Public works are very prone to political capture. Thus, it has been persuasively argued 
that the Maharashtra EGS benefited the kulak lobby and the Maratha elite (Herring & 
Edwards, 1983; Patel, 2006). Alongside such tendencies, there is likely to be bureaucratic 
capture, with local bureaucrats taking a financial cut in allocating work opportunities. 
However, the most damning criticism of public works is that they tend not to benefit the 
poorest and most economically insecure. Only about 30–40 per cent of the total public 
expenditure on the Maharashtra EGS reached the poor (Ravallion, 1991). Some other schemes 
may have fared somewhat better, but there can be little doubt that the leakages are substantial, 
due to ineffective targeting, expensive administration, corruption and inefficient 
implementation. 
In 2005, the Indian Government launched the most ambitious public works scheme of 
all, the Mahatma Ghandi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), to 
‘guarantee’ employment to the rural poor, with each poor household guaranteed 100 days of 
employment per year. In 2010, the Government claimed the scheme had provided 
employment to 49 million rural households in the most recent fiscal year, with 70 per cent of 
works related to water and other environmental projects (Jha, 2010). While NREGS has been 
held up by the Government as a great success, it does not appear to have overcome the 
criticisms outlined above, including costly administration, corruption and nepotism, exclusion 
of certain groups and creation of poor quality non-sustainable jobs. 
In sum, while public works will remain popular as part of job creation efforts, they are 
dubious on several counts. The jobs are often not allocated to the most insecure and poorest. 
The schemes are also paternalistic, in that officials decide what is to be done and, usually, by 
whom and on what basis. It is also doubtful whether public works satisfy the rights-not-
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charity principle, since they are, at best, a way of giving discretionary entitlement to selected 
individuals or households or communities. 
 
Employment subsidies 
The use of employment subsidies has been advocated in a number of developing countries. 
The ostensible rationale is that, if employers are offered a subsidy for the extra jobs they 
create, total employment will increase. Moreover, in addition to boosting demand for labour, 
they help the low paid obtain jobs. It is supposed that these workers do not obtain jobs 
without subsidies because their potential productivity is below the market wage. Less widely 
publicised, subsidies are intended to boost certain sectors and, often, to help export industries 
or strengthen sectors threatened by imports. 
However, employment subsidies typically twist the demand for labour towards less-
skilled, lower-paid labour. In doing so, they may well encourage labour-intensive production 
that results in lower productivity in general and even technological stagnation. This is 
scarcely conducive to long-term growth and development. Moreover, labour subsidies not 
only encourage the inefficient allocation of labour and distort relative prices, but are also 
likely to be a subsidy to capital rather than to workers. They allow firms to pay lower wages, 
knowing that the incomes of workers are being topped up by the subsidy, or allowing them to 
retain the subsidy for themselves. 
Employment subsidies tend to discriminate against older, well-established firms in 
favour of new, growing firms. This is intrinsically inequitable, since it penalises firms that 
have been providing employment for some time relative to newcomers. This could merely 
result in a substitution of subsidised jobs in new firms for non-subsidised jobs in older firms. 
The net effect on jobs could thus be minimal.  
Page 18 of 53International Journal of Social Welfare
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 19 
In the global context, labour subsidies could become an issue before the World Trade 
Organisation as an unfair trade practice. Among the biggest subsidy schemes are earned-
income tax credits, developed on a vast scale in the USA and copied in various forms in 
Western Europe. They may not be deliberately selective of export or import sectors, but there 
can be little doubt that, at the margin, they influence national competitiveness. 
Labour subsidies do not satisfy social justice principles either. In practice, they tend to 
go to the near-poor, rather than the most insecure, if they do not merely go to capital rather 
than to labour. They also go to support paid employment, rather than to all forms of work, 
including non-wage economic activities and care work.  
A final comment on subsidies must be emphasised. The world is awash with them. Yet 
most economists recognise that they encourage inefficiency and tend to go to capital rather 
than to workers and the poor. When commentators say that the state cannot afford more 
transfers to the poor, or more social spending in general, they should be reminded that, even 
in developing countries, on average subsidies to the rich reach as much as 5-6% of total GDP. 
Labour subsidies are not good for global trade or development, and rarely reach the poor. 
 
Microcredit and microfinance  
Microfinance and microcredit have become hugely popular as development tools. In 2006, the 
Nobel Peace Prize was given to the founder of the Grameen Bank, the leading provider of 
microcredit, which has a long history in Bangladesh.  
The primary feature of microcredit schemes is the provision of small loans to the poor 
and vulnerable, as start-up capital for small business activity to set up micro-enterprises or to 
become self-employed. Group lending is encouraged, and the outstanding aspect has been the 
heavy orientation of lending to women.  
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Advocates of microcredit claim that it encourages participatory involvement, and is self-
targeting and empowering. Some schemes appear to have a good record of reimbursement; 
others much less so. Crucially, for those concerned with the promotion of livelihoods, 
microcredit has been seen as a means of tying people over during periods of economic 
difficulty, thereby providing informal insurance, preventing a collapse of small-scale 
businesses and a drift into unemployment.    
 The main concerns associated with microcredit schemes are their sustainability, their 
limited scope and their proneness to governance failure. Some believe that they are too small 
to deal with systemic shocks and systemic risk. They are also criticised for creating a new 
form of dependency, drawing the near-poor to rely on the microcredit institution for a series 
of small loans (Kabeer, 2001). It should not be overlooked that credit is rarely a way out of 
poverty, simply because borrowing implies a debt that has to be repaid. 
 There is also a question mark about the ability of microcredit schemes to reach the very 
poor, since those working in what has been called the ‘mini economy’ require such small 
amounts of money that even the microcredit institutions cannot handle the sums, due to 
standardized administrative and monitoring costs (Matin, Hulme & Rutherford, 1999). And 
there are questions about the cost and sustainability of group loans, which require group 
meetings, group pressures and associated costs (Besley & Coate, 1995). 
 Most worrying of all is the suggestion that, rather than empowering women, microcredit 
may actually reinforce patriarchal subordination of women (Goetz & Sen Gupta, 1996; 
Rahman, 1999). The suggestion is that women are induced to over-extend their work 
commitments, putting them under more pressure.  
 Finally, many observers have questioned the sustainability of microcredit institutions 
without the large donor assistance they have long been receiving. And it appears that there has 
been a drift away from the original idea of ‘group lending with joint liability’ towards 
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conventional individual lending and, in the process, a move away from a focus on the poorest 
and most economically insecure. 
 
Regulatory interventions 
Numerous economists and commentators have advocated labour market de-regulation, 
claiming that there has been an international move to de-regulated markets. This is far from 
being the case. The period of globalisation has been one in which more new regulations have 
been introduced than at any time in human history.  
In fact, it has been an era of labour re-regulation, in which many of the institutions and 
protective regulations built up in the first three quarters of the twentieth century have been 
whittled away and replaced by new types of regulation. These have tended to be pro-
individualistic, more favourable for corporations than for employees, or more directive, 
selective and conditional in character.    
The country where the thrust of new labour regulations has been most clear is China, as 
it has gone about the business of fashioning a national labour market. The emerging 
regulatory framework will have repercussions for the global economy, simply because China 
has become one of the two industrial workshops of the world, along with India, which has 
also been re-regulating its labour relations, encouraging labour market flexibility and revising 
its labour law. 
 
Cash transfers as labour market policy for beating poverty and insecurity 
The dominance of social democratic thinking in social policy and neo-liberal thinking in 
economic policy has combined to block thinking about the simplest way of all of responding 
to income poverty – giving people income in the form of money, as basic income transfers. 
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For decades in the late twentieth century this was dismissed almost out of hand. 
Unconditional transfers in particular were regarded as a waste of money, unaffordable, 
conducive to sloth and socially irresponsible behaviour, and a denial of the famed reciprocity 
principle (something should only be given to someone if they give something in return).  
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, a remarkable turnaround in thinking has 
occurred. Humanitarian relief organisations have come to appreciate that the advantages of 
cash transfers include speed, transparency and the ability to allow those in need to make 
choices about how they spend the aid, thereby enabling them to retain a greater sense of 
dignity in times of crisis (Creti & Jaspars, 2006). Experience with such schemes has further 
highlighted their potential as anti-poverty devices (Author 2007, 2008).  
In various countries in Africa and Asia, cash grants to households affected by 
emergencies such as crop failure or drought have enabled them to rebuild assets and 
regenerate livelihoods. A study of a pilot cash transfer scheme in Zambia, which gave a 
modest sum to very poor households, with no conditions on how it was spent, found that the 
money went predominantly on basic consumption goods, and education and healthcare for 
family members (Schubert, 2005). 
It has been estimated that, if the Zambian scheme were scaled up to reach the poorest 
10 per cent of households, the cost would be a mere 5 per cent of total overseas aid to the 
country, or about 0.5 per cent of Zambia’s gross national income. In other words, a national 
scheme is financially feasible. It would be cheaper than food aid, and would have the 
advantage of going directly to the poor and vulnerable, without the high administrative costs 
and various forms of corruption associated with commodity-based schemes. And whereas 
food aid damages local food markets by deterring local producers, cash transfers do the 
opposite by helping to stimulate local markets. In Zambia, no less than 70 per cent of all 
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social transfers are spent on locally-produced goods and services, thus generating local 
employment or livelihoods (DFID, 2005; Samson et al., 2006).  
In Latin America, cash transfers to women with children have become a central part of 
social and development policy. Both the Bolsa famila in Brazil and the Oportunidades 
scheme in Mexico, and similar schemes in other parts of the region, have covered very large 
proportions of their populations, resulting in the generation of macro-economic demand for 
basic goods and services produced within the domestic economy. Importantly, far from 
encouraging idleness and discouraging paid employment, these schemes have had the 
opposite effect, enabling women to take jobs outside the home. 
The scope for cash transfers in Africa, Asia and Latin America has thus been 
recognized, becoming a significant part of non-contributory social protection and a means of 
enhancing work opportunities. 
  
Concluding remarks 
Most labour market interventions in developing countries have suffered from common 
failings – a lack of transparency, high fiscal cost, a woeful lack of accountability, chronic 
inefficiency in the sense of misuse of resources and in reaching those for which the schemes 
are intended, an extraordinary record of failure to reach the poorest and most insecure, and a 
failure to reduce inequalities in the labour market. Often the expenditure fosters corruption 
and results in much of the benefit going to groups that are less in need. And yet hope seems to 
spring eternal. In particular, developing countries are still being encouraged to look to 
yesterday’s mechanisms of industrialised countries. Many continue to refer to ‘the Swedish 
model’ as a system that is both desirable and feasible as if it were still in existence.  
The real message should be that labour market policies are better at helping labour 
markets function more efficiently in various ways than in overcoming poverty and economic 
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insecurity. Labour markets are part of the broader economic system. Policymakers would be 
better advised to look to social policies to deal with poverty and the mal-distribution of 
income rather than expect that, in the near or distant future, labour markets will deal with 
these fundamental features of a market economy.  
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Labour market policies, poverty and insecurity 
 
Abstract 
The article sets out to evaluate the performance of conventional labour market and social 
policies in the era of globalised labour markets in terms of poverty alleviation, equality and 
security. To this end, it develops a framework based on three key policy evaluation principles, 
centred on the normative notion of social justice, whereby the expansion of full freedom 
requires basic economic security for all. The article is organised as follows: After 
summarising main labour market trends, the article proceeds by analysing conventional labour 
market policies, targeted labour schemes, regulatory interventions and cash transfers as labour 
market policy. 
Key words: labour markets, cash transfers, poverty, insecurity 
 
Introduction 
We are in the midst of a global transformation in which one of the most distinctive features is 
the painful evolution of a globalising labour market. This transformation testifies not only to 
the spread of capitalism to all parts of the world economy but also to the establishment of a 
particular variant of capitalism based on the belief that all markets should be flexible. There 
has accordingly been an international move to more flexible labour systems (Standing, 1999a) 
but, more broadly, for the first time in history, all groups in all societies are expected to face 
insecurity and accept risk [deleted hyphen] taking as a way of life. 
The outcome has been heightened social and economic insecurity, and rising economic 
inequality. In particular, there has been a big shift in the functional distribution of income 
within countries and across the global economy, giving workers (labour) a reduced share and 
capital (profits) a much greater share. Personal income distribution has become more unequal, 
Page 27 of 53 International Journal of Social Welfare
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 2 
and wage differentials between those with tertiary schooling and others have also tended to 
widen.  
It is increasingly accepted that these trends reflect the impact of globalisation and 
economic liberalisation rather than the impact of technological and structural changes that 
have raised the return to education. Policies focused on altering the characteristics of workers 
(to make them more ‘employable’) would thus not be the appropriate answer to the inequality 
and poverty associated with globalisation. 
The article sets out to evaluate the performance of conventional labour market and 
social policies in the era of globalised labour markets in terms of poverty alleviation, equality 
and security. To this end, it develops a framework based on three main policy evaluation 
principles, centred on the normative notion of social justice, whereby the expansion of full 
freedom requires basic economic security for all. The article is organised as follows: After 
summarising main labour market trends, the article proceeds by analysing conventional labour 
market policies, targeted labour schemes, regulatory interventions and cash transfers as labour 
market policy. 
 
Labour market trends 
Before considering the advantages and disadvantages of specific labour market policies, it is 
worth summarising the main trends and challenges for the relief of poverty and insecurity in 
developing countries. 
First and foremost, the global labour force has quadrupled since 1980. The increase in 
labour supply available for open labour markets has risen faster still, particularly since China 
and India have liberalised their economies, allowing multinationals to shift all or part of their 
production to extremely low-wage areas in which there is effectively an unlimited labour 
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supply at existing wage rates. While the rate of increase may slow, the world’s working-age 
population will continue to grow.   
Second, ageing – and old-age poverty – is a global trend. Already most of the world’s 
elderly live in developing countries. While labour market policies have understandably tended 
to pay more attention to the many millions of disaffected youth, policies to enable older 
people to have a dignifying livelihood will require a much higher priority in coming years. 
Third, a majority of the world’s population now lives in or around urban areas and, as 
part of that urbanisation process, various forms of migration are spreading. Much of the 
movement is linked to labour and the increasingly transient and precarious nature of labour 
relations. There has been a growth of international household chains, whereby millions of 
people migrate from low-income areas to perform menial labour in rich and middle-income 
countries, often leaving behind them structurally vulnerable households and families 
dependent on remittances. 
Fourth, the global system is increasingly characterised by ‘tertiarisation’: most people in 
jobs are doing service activities, rather than agricultural, mining or manufacturing labour. 
Even in China and India, the two industrial workshops of the world economy, very rapid rates 
of industrial growth have not been associated with growth of manufacturing employment. 
 Fifth, the defining feature of the globalisation era has been the spread of 
informalisation. Far from being a residual destined to shrink as economies industrialised, 
informalisation has become pervasive. Large modern enterprises have been leading the way, 
by contracting out much of their labour function, using sub-contractors, casual labour and 
agency labour. In addition, partly driven by structural adjustment programmes, state 
enterprises in many countries have systematically contracted out large parts of their formal 
employment.  
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Labour informalisation is associated with precariousness, lack of labour contracts and 
widespread illegality. On average, incomes and wages are much lower for informal labour 
(see e.g. Fundação SEADE, 2005; Sengupta, Kannan & Raveendran, 2008). However, it 
would be a mistake to interpret informalisation simply as chronic impoverished under-
employment, a distinct and homogenous ‘informal sector’. Informalisation increasingly 
applies to jobs associated with formal enterprises, and many people work informally by 
choice. 
Sixth, another feature of the globalised labour system is global feminisation (Standing, 
1989, 1999b). This reflects a double trend – a spread of precarious forms of labour and a 
relative growth of employment of women, the latter partly reflecting the restructuring of 
employment and labour towards the sort of jobs traditionally taken by women. 
   
Conventional labour market policies 
What we might call conventional labour market policies were developed during the course of 
the twentieth century as part of welfare state capitalism, based on an ‘industrial citizenship’ 
model linking social entitlements to holding a formal job. They include minimum wage 
policy, unemployment insurance benefits and labour market training schemes, as well as 
schemes to promote various forms of mobility – geographical, occupational and social. 
Implicit is the assumption that jobs are there to be had, if not now then in the near future.   
With all forms of labour market policy – and social policy in general – there has been 
insufficient evaluation of their effects and effectiveness. This is particularly true for policies 
that have been tried in developing countries. In some cases, there is what should be described 
as monitoring, but not evaluation. Thus, official statistics may show that 1,000 workers were 
covered by a wage subsidy, leading some commentators to claim that the subsidy generated 
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1,000 jobs, whereas the workers or firms benefiting from the subsidy may simply have 
displaced others not receiving the subsidy. 
A further difficulty with evaluating labour market policies is that they usually have 
several and sometimes conflicting objectives. For instance, they may be rationalised as 
instruments for reducing poverty or unemployment and as instruments for improving 
economic growth and productivity. But which of those objectives has priority? If short-term 
growth and productivity improvement were uppermost, the policy might concentrate on 
raising the employment of the highly educated and others with formal skills, since their short-
term productivity would be greater than would be likely among the poor and less educated. 
Indeed, in some cases, laying off workers would be a way of raising average productivity and 
boosting profitability and growth; this was a deliberate policy pursued by the Chinese 
government in the 1990s. 
 We shall consider the main pillars of labour market policy from the vantage point of 
poverty alleviation, coupled with certain policy evaluation principles. The principles are 
elaborated elsewhere (ILO, 2004; Standing, 2002) but, for our purposes, the three most 
important are: 
• A policy is socially just only if it improves the security and work prospects of the least 
secure groups in society (the security difference principle); 
• A policy is socially just only if it does not impose controls on some groups that are not 
imposed on the most free groups in society (the paternalism test principle); 
• A policy is socially just if it enhances the rights of the recipient of benefits or services and 
limits the discretionary power of the providers (the rights-not-charity principle). 
[Removed bullet. Need to leave space before this paragraph.] First, we may make a few 
remarks on direct regulatory interventions with respect to child labour and discrimination.  
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Child labour policy 
Child labour and poverty are obviously closely related. Very poor communities with limited 
resources usually rely to some extent on the work input of children. It is often not easy to ban 
child labour of all kinds in these societies. In recent years, the International Labour 
Organisation has modified its stance and its International Programme for the Elimination of 
Child Labour (IPEC) has pursued a policy of banning the most hazardous forms of child 
labour.  
Such labour threatens children with permanent impoverishment, as well as injury and 
illness. However, the optimum way to curb child labour is to give families adequate economic 
security and incentives for them to ensure that their children enrol and attend primary and 
secondary school. Schemes such as the Bolsa familia in Brazil and Oportunidades in Mexico, 
whereby mothers receive a monthly basic income on the condition that their children attend 
school, have shown themselves to be much more effective in tackling child labour and in 
reducing poverty than simple bans, even though reducing child labour has not usually been an 
explicit objective (Understanding Children’s Work, 2010, pp.93-95; United Nations, 2007, 
pp.58-64).     
 
Anti-discrimination measures 
All countries experience patterns of discrimination in the allocation of labour and work, for 
example, against women, migrants or ethnic minorities. Measures to combat discrimination 
are essential tools against poverty and inequality. But too often laws are passed and then 
grossly inadequate resources are devoted to ensure that they are effectively implemented.  
One consequence of the ideological onslaught on public expenditure around the world 
has been the rundown of labour inspectorates. Poorly paid labour inspectors are subject to 
bribes and threats, and cannot monitor discriminatory practices and such matters as non-
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payment of wages, and neglect of health and safety procedures. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that numerous workers in Asia, Africa and Latin America are impoverished by non-adherence 
to basic labour laws. A simple but rather overlooked policy that appears to have been 
successful in Brazil (Seidman, 2010) would be to pay labour inspectors higher wages and 
benefits, improving their quality and enabling them to resist ‘backhanders’ and other forms of 
pressure that make them so ineffectual. They play a small, unglamorous role in limiting 
labour market poverty.    
 
Minimum wages 
Statutory minimum wages really only work moderately to reduce poverty in industrial labour 
markets where formal employment is high and collective bargaining is widespread. Although 
they still exist in many countries, they have dwindled in their effectiveness. They are hard to 
apply in flexible informal labour markets, and require institutions to monitor them.  
Critics have long claimed that minimum wages hurt rather than help low-skilled, low-
productivity workers, who make up a large proportion of the poor in most countries. If 
minimum wages are set at subsistence level, low-skilled workers are either excluded from 
employment or are employed only in unregistered activities, leaving them vulnerable to 
exploitation and a lack of protective safeguards. Yet the critics surely exaggerate the negative 
effect of minimum wages, if only because they cannot be and are not effectively 
implemented. They may, at best, provide a standard of decency, to guide employers and 
workers on what would be fair and reasonable. That in itself is reason enough to maintain 
them. 
 
Unemployment benefits 
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Unemployment insurance benefits, where employees paid contributions or had them paid for 
by their employers, were conceived in the late nineteenth century, and spread to all 
industrialised countries in the early decades of the twentieth century. Attempts were then 
made to introduce them to developing countries, with very limited success. In the rich welfare 
states, benefit schemes started to diverge in the 1970s, with some countries moving to 
unemployment assistance (means-tested benefits given to those who could demonstrate that 
they were both poor and involuntarily unemployed) and others adopting workfare-type 
schemes (benefits provided only on the condition that the recipient complied with some 
behaviour linked to the labour market, such as taking a low-status, low-paid job or entering a 
labour market training scheme). 
The fact is that Old-style unemployment insurance benefit schemes are thus rapidly 
disappearing in industrialised countries and very few developing countries have functional 
unemployment benefit systems at all, one exception being the Republic of Korea. In most of 
those that have some scheme, only tiny minorities of the unemployed have entitlement to 
benefits. There is no reason to believe that, in the foreseeable future, state-based 
unemployment protection could become an effective weapon against poverty and labour 
market marginalisation in developing countries. 
 
Social insurance versus social assistance 
The underlying principle of social insurance has been that contributions, whether paid by 
employers or employees, would match benefits paid out, making the system fiscally neutral. 
In the process, a loose system of social solidarity would be established, with those fortunate 
enough not to need benefits subsidising those who did need them. Benefit entitlements would 
be determined by contingency risks, linked to unemployment, illness, maternity and so on.  
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Even in the rich industrialised countries, it has not worked out quite like that, and in 
developing countries social insurance has failed dismally as an anti-poverty policy. In flexible 
labour markets with high levels of informality, only very small proportions of the labour force 
are covered by social insurance schemes. Indeed, they are regressive since, to the extent that 
they work at all, they provide benefits and protection for higher-income employees. Social 
insurance contributions are easy to avoid in informal labour markets, while for many workers 
in casual or informal economic activities building up entitlements can be practically 
impossible. 
The trend in industrialised countries has been to shift towards much greater use of social 
assistance in determining entitlement to benefits, through means testing and so-called 
‘targeting’. Advocates of moving further in this direction claim that determining who is poor 
by checking on their income will direct benefits to the poorest, and that such targeting will 
ensure good use of scarce resources and help legitimise tax-based social transfers with 
middle-class voters. 
All parts of that argument are dubious. Evidence shows that means testing is costly to 
undertake and notoriously inequitable and inefficient (see ILO, 2004 and sources cited there). 
In developing countries, it is very hard to define or measure the poverty line reliably and 
meaningfully, and whatever measure is used the take-up rate is very low. Those who do 
manage to receive such benefits are often the near-poor rather than the poorest. And means 
testing produces severe poverty traps, since anybody who begins to earn income risks losing 
the benefit. There are other objections, including the stigmatizing effects of such schemes. 
And ultimately they turn out to be discretionary, since local bureaucrats and politicians can 
manipulate them to give to those they wish to support and exclude others. 
 
Labour market training 
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Training is often regarded as the definitive ‘active’ labour market policy. The common belief 
is that an important source of poverty and unemployment is a lack of skills and inadequate 
training schemes. Yet the evidence for this is scarce. 
For one thing, statistics on the possession of skills are rare. Most of the available 
information refers to the distribution of jobs and the numbers having primary, secondary and 
tertiary schooling, both very crude indicators of skill. There is also little convincing evidence 
that skill shortages are major impediments to economic growth, or a critical barrier to poverty 
alleviation. 
Labour market training refers to government schemes. In some cases, the government 
funds a training centre and funds the attendance of trainees, giving them a stipend or simply 
subsidising the training costs. Such schemes tend to suffer from an understandable pattern of 
‘creaming’, whereby most of the trainees - particularly most of the trainees who successfully 
complete the training course and who subsequently obtain employment - are not from the 
poorest groups in society.  
In the other, more popular, type of training scheme the government or donor provides a 
subsidy to firms to provide more training. This policy suffers from three major drawbacks. 
First, the training is unlikely to be provided to the most disadvantaged and poor groups, since 
they are likely to be perceived as the hardest to train and the least likely to yield a high rate of 
return to the employer. Second, the schemes are likely to have a large deadweight effect, that 
is, the subsidy will be provided to firms that would have done the training anyhow. And third, 
they are likely to have a large substitution effect (or displacement effect), that is, they are 
likely to result in firms substituting workers receiving the training subsidy for other workers 
or trainees who are not doing so.    
More broadly, there has been an international trend towards shaping educational policy 
in general in the direction of ‘human capital’ formation. Universities and colleges are being 
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encouraged to focus increasingly on preparing young people for jobs. There is also a strong 
trend towards the privatisation and commercialisation of schooling at all levels, not just at the 
tertiary end of the spectrum. These developments are controversial, since they are 
transforming the nature of education, eroding it as preparation for life and culture in the 
narrower interest of ‘employability’, and making schooling a matter of investment and so 
more selective of those who can pay and of those interested in subjects that promise a market 
return. 
State pensions as labour market policy  
Old-age and other pensions might not be seen as labour market policy. However, their 
existence and design are crucial determinants of patterns of work and labour as well as the 
extent of old-age poverty and the income status of others receiving a form of pension, such as 
those qualifying for disability benefits. 
The story of pensions in the globalisation era is fairly clear. There has been shrinking 
coverage by defined-benefit contributory schemes around the world. Instead, governments 
and corporations have been shifting to defined-contribution schemes, while many more 
workers are finding that they have no state or corporate pension linked to their employment. 
In developing countries, only tiny minorities receive adequate corporate (so-called 
occupational) pensions or public sector pensions. 
Instead, the two types of schemes that have spread are individual savings accounts, as 
developed in Chile in the 1980s and has been copied to a certain extent in many countries 
since then, and so-called social pensions. Whereas the Chilean experience has demonstrated 
clearly that the individualised defined-contribution route leads to greater old-age inequality 
and poverty among a large proportion of pension-age people, social pensions offer a realistic 
means of lowering poverty, not only among the elderly but also among their younger 
relatives. There is convincing evidence (reviewed in Standing, 2007, 2008) that they have had 
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a positive effect in reducing poverty and community deprivation in countries such as South 
Africa, Namibia, Nepal and Mauritius. (for a review of evidence, see Author, 2007, 2008). 
By definition, social pensions are universal and rights-based. Where they exist they 
result in a very high take-up rate, in excess of 90 per cent of the age group, which compares 
extremely well with all other types of pension scheme. They offer a social protection floor 
and they are also an effective redistributive fiscal instrument. In South Africa, for instance, it 
has been argued that the basic old-age pension has been the only effective means of reducing 
income inequality in the country (Case & Deaton, 1998). Social pensions have also proved to 
be affordable, admittedly partly because of the low amount of income provided but partly also 
because of the low administrative cost. Moreover, they have the rather valuable property of 
transparency, in that everybody knows what should be paid and who is entitled, making 
political or bureaucratic corruption harder.  
Evidence shows that Social pensions can and do help fund the schooling and nutrition of 
grandchildren (see HelpAge International, 2006, and sources cited there). They also help 
elderly people participate in the economy, and enable families in rural areas to take risks by 
buying seeds and fertilisers, knowing that they have a regular source of income on which to 
rely. As such, social pensions have beneficial effects on livelihood regeneration. They also 
score highly on the three key policy evaluation principles, reaching those in most need, being 
non-paternalistic (no behavioural conditions) and being based on rights rather than 
discretionary acts of state or private charity. 
 
Targeted labour schemes 
The world has accumulated vast experience and knowledge about selective or targeted labour 
market schemes. We may focus on four types of schemes that have figured in many 
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developing countries – food-for-work schemes, public works, employment and wage 
subsidies, and microcredit and finance. 
 
Food-for-work schemes 
Under this rubric we may include all schemes that offer participants some specific commodity 
in return for labour. It has usually been food, but in some cases it has been clothes or other 
items. The distribution of food parcels in return for labouring on an infrastructural project has 
been an instrument of state policy for many generations all over the world. Some countries 
have relied very heavily on food-for-work schemes. In Ethiopia, for instance, albeit an 
extreme case, the government has devoted 80 per cent of its food assistance to food-for-work 
projects. 
The primary claim is that such schemes effectively target the poor: they are self-
selecting, since they require applicants to go and queue for opportunities. And like all direct 
employment measures of the workfare kind, they are relatively easy to legitimise among the 
middle class, who can see people working for their food. It is also argued that such schemes 
can be relatively easily focused on pre-determined vulnerable groups, notably women. Indeed, 
the World Food Programme, which has been a major player behind food-for-work schemes, 
has required governments to make women the principal beneficiaries. 
The main shortcoming of food-for-work schemes is the onerous labour often involved 
so that those working in the heat and dust use up more calories than they gain from the food 
given to them at the end. The schemes may actually be detrimental to participants’ health, 
particularly women, as has been observed in Ethiopia, India and Nepal (Osmani, 1997; 
Quisumbing, 2003). 
Besides being inefficient and rarely producing much of lasting value, another failing of 
food-for-work schemes is the powerful tendency for officials to misappropriate the food, 
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either for their own consumption or, more often, to sell it for profit. A study of the National 
Food for Work Programme in Andhra Pradesh, India, found that in the villages examined, the 
proportion of rice misappropriated by politicians and bureaucrats varied between 49 and 98 
per cent (Dreze, 2006).   
 It is doubtful whether food-for-work schemes are an appropriate policy for promoting 
livelihoods except in extreme circumstances. They are unlikely to reach the most desperately 
in need and they are obviously paternalistic, presuming that what is missing is food. They are 
also more consistent with charity than with the extension of human rights.  
 
Public works 
Public works have a hallowed place in both development policy and anti-unemployment 
strategies. As social policy, public works are often presented as self-selecting or self-
targeting, on the grounds that only those who are desperately in need of income will offer 
their labour. And it is often claimed that public works not only bring the poor up to or above 
some poverty line but also help to lower wages in the labour market.  
Public works can and often do create some infrastructure. The question is whether the 
results are sustainable, durable or more efficient than other ways of producing such 
infrastructure. There are too many stories of shoddy output from public works, with roads 
hastily and cheaply built being washed away by the first heavy rains. This is particularly 
likely where the objective of maximising employment leads to highly labour-intensive 
methods based on unskilled, poorly supervised and ill-trained labour.  
A related criticism of public works is that they tend to be predominantly short-term 
‘make-work’ schemes. Productivity is low, and the labour is temporary, so they do not 
provide either value for money or sustainable employment. Inefficiency is compounded by 
high administrative and monitoring costs, which severely cut the proportion of funds spent on 
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public works that goes to the intended beneficiaries. It is generally estimated that, oOf all 
forms of social protection, public works have the highest administrative and other non-wage 
costs as a share of total expenditure (see e.g. Betcherman, Dar, Luinstra & Ogawa, 2000, 
pp.16, 22; Samson, van Niekerk & MacQuene, 2006, p.112). 
It is also clear that often there are large-scale substitution and deadweight effects. In 
other words, those employed on public works may merely displace others doing the same 
work for private firms, or they may be doing something that would have been done anyhow.  
Another criticism is that the degree of effective targeting is, in practice, very limited. 
The usual objective is to provide labour for the poorest and for the unemployed in greatest 
financial need. However, numerous evaluation studies have found that this is not what usually 
happens (see e.g. Chirwa, 2007; ILO, 2004, pp.371-2; Jha, Bhattacharyya & Gaiha, 2009).  
. One obvious problem is that public works discriminate against labour-constrained 
households. Another is that those living far from the worksites have the greatest difficulty in 
taking the available work opportunities. And those with disabilities are least likely to be able 
to do the work on offer. Women, in particular, are often penalised because of severe time 
pressure due to their other work demands in and around the home.  
This bias against women can be countered by design changes, as in the Zibambele 
scheme in South Africa, where 93 per cent of participants were women (McCord, 2004; 
Samson et al., 2006). India’s Mahatma Ghandi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (NREGS) has established anti-discrimination provisions, access to on-site childcare 
and worksites close to the homes of potential participants. However, similar provisions were 
included in the long-running Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme, on which the 
NREGS was modelled, and which still has only a minority of women among its participants, 
even though many more women have traditionally been registered in the scheme (Gaiha & 
Imai, 2005). 
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Even if public works do succeed in exclusively targeting the poor, they may create 
poverty traps, with all the moral and immoral hazards that these entail. Immoral hazards arise 
from an inducement to lie in order to qualify for participation in a scheme. In very poor 
communities, the poor and vulnerable will have an interest in staying just below the poverty 
line or at least appearing to do so, simply in order to qualify for the available income-support 
scheme on offer. This is surely a perverse incentive.  
Another controversy centres on the wages paid to participants in public works. Many 
supporters believe the schemes should pay decent wages, or the market wage rate. Often, the 
wage is determined by that prevailing for agricultural manual labour, which is supported by 
some economists (Ravallion, 1999). Others have said the wage should be below the market 
wage (Hirway & Terhal, 1994; Subbarao, 2003), and some argue that schemes should pay at 
or even below the minimum wage, as a means of self-targeting the poor.  
Certainly, the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) long limited 
participation with a low minimum wage, which was how it maintained its claim to ‘guarantee’ 
work for all those applying. Once the courts ruled that it had to pay the official minimum 
wage, and particularly after the minimum wage went up, the scheme had to ration labour, 
ceasing to be a ‘guarantee’ (Subbarao, 2003).  
As with other cash-for-work schemes, if the wage is set below subsistence it offends 
principles underlying minimum wage laws, and may intensify poverty (McCord, 2005). And 
if the objective of paying sub-subsistence wages is to induce self-targeting, the result may be 
the opposite of what is intended, because it may mean that only those with access to some 
other source of income can afford to take the low-paying public works jobs. Most perversely 
of all, paying sub-subsistence wages may actually worsen the poverty of the participants if 
they are induced to give up other forms of work, and if this disrupts structured livelihood 
systems in local communities.  
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For example, in the public projects in Malawi, the wage was set at the equivalent of 
US$0.30 per day. An evaluation study commissioned by the government found that the very 
low wages were ineffective in recruiting the very poor, while participants risked greater 
poverty as a result of the hard manual labour that required more food, leaving them more 
exposed to malnutrition and healthcare needs (Chirwa et al., 2004). Poor labour-constrained 
households may be unable to take very low-wage jobs because they would have to give up 
other essential domestic and subsistence activities.    
Paying low wages on public works also tends to lower the average wage in other jobs in 
low-income areas. Perversely, this could result in more widespread impoverishment by 
depressing family incomes. Moreover, many public works schemes have been dilatory in 
paying workers. In the Malawi scheme, delays in payment went on for months, resulting in 
indebtedness and considerable local distress (Chirwa, McCord, Mvula & Pinder, 2004).  
Public works are very prone to political capture. Thus, it has been persuasively argued 
that the Maharashtra EGS benefited the kulak lobby and the Maratha elite (Herring & 
Edwards, 1983; Patel & Mayda, 2006). Alongside such tendencies, there is likely to be 
bureaucratic capture, with local bureaucrats taking a financial cut in allocating work 
opportunities. 
However, the most damning criticism of public works is that they tend not to benefit the 
poorest and most economically insecure. Only about 30–40 per cent of the total public 
expenditure on the Maharashtra EGS reached the poor (Ravallion, 1991). Some other schemes 
may have fared somewhat better, but there can be little doubt that the leakages are substantial, 
due to ineffective targeting, expensive administration, corruption and inefficient 
implementation. 
In 2005, the Indian government launched the most ambitious public works scheme of 
all, the Mahatma Ghandi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), to 
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‘guarantee’ employment to the rural poor, with each poor household guaranteed 100 days of 
employment per year. In 2010, the government claimed the scheme had provided employment 
to 49 million rural households in the most recent fiscal year, with 70 per cent of works related 
to water and other environmental projects (Jha, 2010). While NREGS has been held up by the 
Government as a great success, it does not appear to have overcome the criticisms outlined 
above, including costly administration, corruption and nepotism, exclusion of certain groups 
and creation of poor quality non-sustainable jobs. 
In sum, while public works will remain popular as part of job creation efforts, they are 
dubious on several counts. The jobs are often not allocated to the most insecure and poorest. 
The schemes are also paternalistic, in that officials decide what is to be done and, usually, by 
whom and on what basis. It is also doubtful whether public works satisfy the rights-not-
charity principle, since they are, at best, a way of giving discretionary entitlement to selected 
individuals or households or communities. 
 
Employment subsidies 
The use of employment subsidies has been advocated in a number of developing countries. 
The ostensible rationale is that, if employers are offered a subsidy for the extra jobs they 
create, total employment will increase. Moreover, in addition to boosting demand for labour, 
they help the low paid obtain jobs. It is supposed that these workers do not obtain jobs 
without subsidies because their potential productivity is below the market wage. Less widely 
publicised, subsidies are intended to boost certain sectors and, often, to help export industries 
or strengthen sectors threatened by imports. 
However, employment subsidies typically twist the demand for labour towards less-
skilled, lower-paid labour. In doing so, they may well encourage labour-intensive production 
that results in lower productivity in general and even technological stagnation. This is 
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scarcely conducive to long-term growth and development. Moreover, labour subsidies not 
only encourage the inefficient allocation of labour and distort relative prices, but are also 
likely to be a subsidy to capital rather than to workers. They allow firms to pay lower wages, 
knowing that the incomes of workers are being topped up by the subsidy, or allowing them to 
retain the subsidy for themselves. 
Employment subsidies tend to discriminate against older, well-established firms in 
favour of new, growing firms. This is intrinsically inequitable, since it penalises firms that 
have been providing employment for some time relative to newcomers. This could merely 
result in a substitution of subsidised jobs in new firms for non-subsidised jobs in older firms. 
The net effect on jobs could thus be minimal.  
In the global context, labour subsidies could become an issue before the World Trade 
Organisation as an unfair trade practice. Among the biggest subsidy schemes are earned-
income tax credits, developed on a vast scale in the USA and copied in various forms in 
Western Europe. They may not be deliberately selective of export or import sectors, but there 
can be little doubt that, at the margin, they influence national competitiveness. 
Labour subsidies do not satisfy social justice principles either. In practice, they tend to 
go to the near-poor, rather than the most insecure, if they do not merely go to capital rather 
than to labour. They also go to support paid employment, rather than to all forms of work, 
including non-wage economic activities and care work.  
A final comment on subsidies must be emphasised. The world is awash with them. Yet 
most economists recognise that they encourage inefficiency and tend to go to capital rather 
than to workers and the poor. When commentators say that the state cannot afford more 
transfers to the poor, or more social spending in general, they should be reminded that, even 
in developing countries, on average subsidies to the rich reach as much as 5-6% of total GDP. 
Labour subsidies are not good for global trade or development, and rarely reach the poor. 
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Microcredit and microfinance  
Microfinance and microcredit have become hugely popular as development tools. In 2006, the 
Nobel Peace Prize was given to the founder of the Grameen Bank, the leading provider of 
microcredit, which has a long history in Bangladesh.  
The primary feature of microcredit schemes is the provision of small loans to the poor 
and vulnerable, as start-up capital for small business activity to set up micro-enterprises or to 
become self-employed. Group lending is encouraged, and the outstanding aspect has been the 
heavy orientation of lending to women.  
Advocates of microcredit claim that it encourages participatory involvement, and is self-
targeting and empowering. Some schemes appear to have a good record of reimbursement; 
others much less so. Crucially, for those concerned with the promotion of livelihoods, 
microcredit has been seen as a means of tying people over during periods of economic 
difficulty, thereby providing informal insurance, preventing a collapse of small-scale 
businesses and a drift into unemployment.    
 The main concerns associated with microcredit schemes are their sustainability, their 
limited scope and their proneness to governance failure. Some believe that they are too small 
to deal with systemic shocks and systemic risk. They are also criticised for creating a new 
form of dependency, drawing the near-poor to rely on the microcredit institution for a series 
of small loans (Kabeer, 2001). It should not be overlooked that credit is rarely a way out of 
poverty, simply because borrowing implies a debt that has to be repaid. 
 There is also a question mark about the ability of microcredit schemes to reach the very 
poor, since those working in what has been called the ‘mini economy’ require such small 
amounts of money that even the microcredit institutions cannot handle the sums, due to 
standardized administrative and monitoring costs (Matin, Hulme & Rutherford, 1999). And 
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there are questions about the cost and sustainability of group loans, which require group 
meetings, group pressures and associated costs (Besley & Coate, 1995). 
 Most worrying of all is the suggestion that, rather than empowering women, microcredit 
may actually reinforce patriarchal subordination of women (Goetz & Sen Gupta, 1996; 
Rahman, 1999). The suggestion is that women are induced to over-extend their work 
commitments, putting them under more pressure.  
 Finally, many observers have questioned the sustainability of microcredit institutions 
without the large donor assistance they have long been receiving. And it appears that there has 
been a drift away from the original idea of ‘group lending with joint liability’ towards 
conventional individual lending and, in the process, a move away from a focus on the poorest 
and most economically insecure. 
 
Regulatory interventions 
Numerous economists and commentators have advocated labour market de-regulation, 
claiming that there has been an international move to de-regulated markets. This is far from 
being the case. The period of globalisation has been one in which more new regulations have 
been introduced than at any time in human history.  
In fact, it has been an era of labour re-regulation, in which many of the institutions and 
protective regulations built up in the first three quarters of the twentieth century have been 
whittled away and replaced by new types of regulation. These have tended to be pro-
individualistic, more favourable for corporations than for employees, or more directive, 
selective and conditional in character.    
The country where the thrust of new labour regulations has been most clear is China, as 
it has gone about the business of fashioning a national labour market. The emerging 
regulatory framework will have repercussions for the global economy, simply because China 
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has become one of the two industrial workshops of the world, along with India, which has 
also been re-regulating its labour relations, encouraging labour market flexibility and revising 
its labour law. 
 
Cash transfers as labour market policy for beating poverty and insecurity 
The dominance of social democratic thinking in social policy and neo-liberal thinking in 
economic policy has combined to block thinking about the simplest way of all of responding 
to income poverty – giving people income in the form of money, as cash transfers. 
For decades in the late twentieth century this was dismissed almost out of hand. 
Unconditional transfers in particular were regarded as a waste of money, unaffordable, 
conducive to sloth and socially irresponsible behaviour, and a denial of the famed reciprocity 
principle (something should only be given to someone if they give something in return).  
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, a remarkable turnaround in thinking has 
occurred. Humanitarian relief organisations have come to appreciate that the advantages of 
cash transfers include speed, transparency and the ability to allow those in need to make 
choices about how they spend the aid, thereby enabling them to retain a greater sense of 
dignity in times of crisis (Creti & Jaspars, 2006). Experience with such schemes has further 
highlighted their potential as anti-poverty devices (Standing, 2007, 2008).  
In various countries in Africa and Asia, cash grants to households affected by 
emergencies such as crop failure or drought have enabled them to rebuild assets and 
regenerate livelihoods. A study of a pilot cash transfer scheme in Zambia, which gave a 
modest sum to very poor households, with no conditions on how it was spent, found that the 
money went predominantly on basic consumption goods, and education and healthcare for 
family members (Schubert, 2005). 
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It has been estimated that, if the Zambian scheme were scaled up to reach the poorest 
10 per cent of households, the cost would be a mere 5 per cent of total overseas aid to the 
country, or about 0.5 per cent of Zambia’s gross national income. In other words, a national 
scheme is financially feasible. It would be cheaper than food aid, and would have the 
advantage of going directly to the poor and vulnerable, without the high administrative costs 
and various forms of corruption associated with commodity-based schemes. And whereas 
food aid damages local food markets by deterring local producers, cash transfers do the 
opposite by helping to stimulate local markets. In Zambia, no less than 70 per cent of all 
social transfers are spent on locally-produced goods and services, thus generating local 
employment or livelihoods (DFID, 2005; Samson et al., 2006).  
In Latin America, cash transfers to women with children have become a central part of 
social and development policy. Both the Bolsa famila in Brazil and the Oportunidades 
scheme in Mexico, and similar programmes in other parts of the region, have covered very 
large proportions of their populations, resulting in the generation of macro-economic demand 
for basic goods and services produced within the domestic economy. Importantly, far from 
encouraging idleness and discouraging paid employment, cash transfers have had the opposite 
effect, enabling women (and men) to take jobs outside the home (see e.g. Ardington, Case & 
Hosegood, 2008; Samson, 2008; Schwartzman, 2005). 
The scope for cash transfers in Africa, Asia and Latin America has thus been recognized 
as a significant means of non-contributory social protection and enhancement of work 
opportunities. 
  
Concluding remarks 
Most labour market interventions in developing countries have suffered from common 
failings – a lack of transparency, high fiscal cost, a woeful lack of accountability, chronic 
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inefficiency in the sense of misuse of resources and in reaching those for which the schemes 
are intended, an extraordinary record of failure to reach the poorest and most insecure, and a 
failure to reduce inequalities in the labour market. Often the expenditure fosters corruption 
and results in much of the benefit going to groups that are less in need. And yet hope seems to 
spring eternal. In particular, developing countries are still being encouraged to look to 
yesterday’s mechanisms of industrialised countries. Many continue to refer to ‘the Swedish 
model’ as a system that is both desirable and feasible as if it were still in existence.  
The real message should be that labour market policies are better at helping labour 
markets function more efficiently in various ways than in overcoming poverty and economic 
insecurity. Labour markets are part of the broader economic system. Policymakers would be 
better advised to look to social policies to tackle poverty and the mal-distribution of income 
rather than expect that, in the near or distant future, labour markets will deal with these 
fundamental features of a market economy.  
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